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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EFFECT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT ON
PROSECUTIONS BEGUN UNDER THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDAIENT.-The defend-
ants were indicted in the federal District Court in North Carolina for con-
spiring to violate the National Prohibition Act and for possessing and trans-
porting intoxicating liquor. The district Judge dismissed the indictment
on the ground that since it had been filed the Eighteenth Amendment of the
federal Constitution had been repealed by the Twenty-First. (5 F. Supp.
153.) Appeal was taken by the United States. Held: Such prosecutions be-
came immediately void upon the ratification of the repeal amendment.
United States v. Chambers et al. (1934) 54 S. Ct. 434.
The result in the principal case is attainable by either of two processes of
reasoning. If common law principles are applied it is clear that the prose-
cution must abate. After the repeal of a penal statute there can be no
prosecution for a violation which occurred before the repeal. People .
Hiller (1897) 113 Mich. 209, 71 N. W. 630; 16 C. J. 70. Cf. Draper v. State
(1909) 6 Ga. App. 12; 64 S. E. 117. Prosecutions which have already been
instituted are also stopped unless the repealing statute contains a saving
clause. United States v. Passmore (1804) 4 Dall. 372; United States v.
Tynen (1871) 78 U. S. 88. This is true even when a plea of guilty has been
entered. Whitehurst v. State (1873) 43 Ind. 473. A failure of the defend-
ant to except at the trial will not validate a conviction. Lunning v. State
(1857) 9 Ind. 309. Since the Constitution is written in the language of the
common law resort can obviously be had to that body of principles in its
interpretation. Schick v. United States (1904) 195 U. S. 65; South Carolina
v. United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437; Ex Parte Grossman (1925) 267
U. S. 87.
This common law principle meets the obstacle of the Congressional enact-
ment that "the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute.
. . ." 1 U. S. C. A. 29. It is apparent that this cannot apply to the situa-
tion in the principal case since the saving statute refers only to acts of Con-
gress and cannot apply to amezdments to the Constitution.
The second method, that largely relied upon by the Court, is a purely con-
stitutional one. The general government is one of granted or delegated au-
thority. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316; Kansas V. Colorado
(1907) 206 U. S. 46. The moment of the consummation of ratification is
when an amendment becomes operative part of the Constitution. Dillon v.
Gloss (1921) 256 U. S. 368. If prosecutions were allowed to continue the
Twenty-First Amendment would be denied immediate effect and there would
be exercised a power which was not contained in the grant to the national
government. The National Prohibition Act thus became unconstitutional
without the usual requirement of a judicial decree. This position is sup-
ported not only by reason but by authority as well. Hollingsworth V. Vir-
ginia (1798) 3 Dall. 378.
The result of the principal case was practically a foregone conclusion. It
is entirely in accord with good principles of legislative interpretation that
the repeal of a penal enactment stops all proceedings thereunder. A more
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debatable question, one not presented in the instant case, is the effect of the
Twenty-First Amendment upon national liquor legislation enacted before
the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. W. M., '36.
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORD.-In a personal
injuries suit it was attempted to introduce as evidence the plaintiff's hospital
record, consisting of entries made by doctors, internes and nurses. Ad-
mitting the abstract admissibility of such evidence on the analogy of entries
made in the regular course of business, the court excluded the instant record
because it was not shown to have been made under the supervision of a
physician qualified to give expert testimony. Paxos v. Jarka Corporation
(Pa. 1934) 171 Atl. 468.
Considerations of logic and expedience would seem to demand that hospital
and insane asylum records be peculiarly favored exceptions to the hearsay
rule; they are "entries in the regular course of business"; the dual require-
ments of necessity and trustworthiness are conspicuously present: such
records are commonly a composite of the observations of persons too numer-
ous to be called from their hospital duties to testify as to easily forgotten
matters of daily routine; they represent scientific data, far more impartial
than many more favored forms of evidence. 3 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923)
par. 1707. A few jurisdictions favor this view. Ribas v. Revere Rubber
Co. (1914) 37 R. I. 189, 91 Atl. 58; Boss v. Illinois Central Ry. Co. (1921) 221
Ill. App. 504. Most courts, however, have been extremely chary in admitting
such records. Some avowedly reject. In re Hock's Will (1911) 129 N. Y. S.
196 Harkness v. Borough of Swissvale (1913) 238 Pa. 544, 86 Atl. 478;
Jordan v. Apter (1919) 93 Conn. 302, 105 AtI. 620. Others, as in the instant
case, honor the rule by way of dictum but manage to find technical excuses
to relieve them from applying it. Lack of necessity is frequently invoked.
Osborne v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1913) 87 Vt. 104, 88 AtI. 512. Where the
superintendent of a hospital made regular case entries based on doctors' re-
ports, and vouched for their authenticity, the entries were rejected because
not made by an actual observer of the patient. Price v. Standard Life &
Acc. Inc. Co. (1903) 90 Minn. 264, 95 N. W. 1118. It was elsewhere inti-
mated that such second-hand reports would be admissible in cases of neces-
sity, but, significantly, the court did not find such necessity present. De-
laney v. Framingham Gas Fuel Co. (1909) 202 Mass. 359, 88 N. E. 773. This
latter dictum seems correct in light of the frequency with which hospital
records are compiled from a series of first-hand reports, by one who has not
observed the actual case. Properly upholding their admission see Ribas v.
Revere Rubber Co., supra. The holding of the instant case is not altogether
blameless of sophistry; it would seem that case data regularly made by a
hospital staff should fulfill the requirements of expert testimony whether or
not the actual supervision of a physician is shown. For this general sub-ject see 1 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923) par. 569.
The findings of official boards of health present similar problems; here the
same narrow policy is pursued. A laboratory analysis of sputum made by
a state board of health was rejected in Fondi v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(1916) 224 Mass. 6, 112 N. E. 612. The finding of a board of draft examiners
during the World War has been ingeniously excluded as an ex parte pro-
ceeding. Laird v. Boston & M. Ry. Co. (N. H. 1921) 114 Atl. 275. Contra see
Casey v. Kennedy (1920) 52 D. L. R. 326.
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